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The Refusal to Disclose Trade Secrets as an Abuse of Market Dominance – Microsoft and Beyond
Gintaré Surblyté
78.75

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Foreword, Table of Contents, List of statutory instruments, List of cases, Bibliography, Abbreviations, Introduction 6.60
Part One: Trade Secrets – The "Achilles heel" in Microsoft 6.60
0.1 Microsoft case
0.1.1 "Super-Dominance"
0.1.2 Markets with Network Effects and Standards
0.1.3 Interoperability
0.1.4 Interface Information
0.2 The "Achilles Heel" in Microsoft
Chapter One: Trade Secrets 6.60
1. International Protection of Trade Secrets
1.1 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
1.2 TRIPS
2. Trade Secret Protection in the U.S.
2.1 Definition of a Trade Secret
2.2 Nature of Trade Secrecy Protection
3. Europe
3.1 European Union
3.2 National Provisions in the Selected European Countries
4. Intermediate Conclusion
Chapter Two: Duty to Disclose Trade Secrets: Opening the Pandora's box? 6.60
1. Trade Secrets and IPRs: "All are equal. But some are more equal than the others?"
2. The Application of Competition Law Provisions to Trade Secrets
Part Two: Refusal to Disclose Trade Secrets 6.60
Chapter Three: A Duty to Disclose Trade Secrets compared to a Compulsory Licensing 6.60
1. Refusal to License: not a per se Abuse of Market Dominance (Volvo)
2. "Exceptional circumstances" test: Does One Size Fit All?
2.1 Magill
2.2 IMS Health
2.3 Microsoft
3. Intermediate Conclusion
Part Three: Competition and Competition Law in the "New" and the "Newest" Economy 6.60
Chapter Four: Competition in the Markets of the "New" Economy 6.60
1. Competitive Process in Schumpeterian Markets
1.1 De facto Standards and Network Effects
1.2 Schumpeterian Competition in Dynamic Markets
2. Schumpeterian Markets and the Theory of Contestability
Chapter Five: Article 102 TFEU in the Light of Trade Secrets and Dynamic Competition 6.60
1. Trade Secrets and the Goals of the European Competition Law in Schumpeterian Markets
1.1 Dynamic Competition
1.2 Allocative Efficiency
1.3 Consumer Welfare
1.4 The Protection of the Dynamic Competitive Process as the Goal of Competition Law
2. Trade Secrets and the Application of Article 102 TFEU in Dynamic Markets
2.1 Dominance in Schumpeterian Markets
2.2 Abuse
Chapter Six: Contestable Schumpeterian Markets 6.60
1. Trade Secrets as Barriers to Access de facto Standards
2. Market-oriented Test for Maintaining Dynamic Competition in Schumpeterian Markets
2.1 A standard technology covered by a trade secret as an indispensable input
2.2 Market foreclosure leading to the elimination of competitive pressure (consequence: the prejudice to consumers due to the reduction of technological advancement (Article 102(b) TFEU))
2.3 Objective justification
Conclusions, Zusammenfassung 6.60
Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Appendix 5, Appendix 6 6.60

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